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MATERIAL SUPPORT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: ELIMINATING TERRORIST
SUPPORT BY PUNISHING THOSE WITH
NO INTENTION TO SUPPORT TERROR?
Bradley A. Parker*
The most odious of all oppressions are those which mask as justice.
Justice Robert H. Jackson1
INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon fundamentally changed the way that law enforce-
ment officials operate and address terrorist threats. Immediately
after the attacks, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) implemented
new procedures that were expected to help prevent and obstruct
future acts of terror that appeared to be imminent.2 In the process,
the DOJ vowed to use every available law to combat the threat that
this new kind of enemy now posed to individuals within the United
States.3 The exigency to obstruct future attacks led to the reevalua-
tion and broad reinterpretation of existing laws that in some situa-
tions has been clearly unconstitutional. Broad interpretations of
seemingly narrow statutes were thought necessary in order to allow
law enforcement officials to effectively obstruct and prevent future
attacks.
The coordination of the attacks and the destruction that it
caused shocked the world and alerted many to the reality that fun-
damentalist and extremist groups were organized and could attack
* Bradley A. Parker, B.S., University of Vermont; J.D., City University of New York
School of Law. I especially appreciate the insightful comments and support provided
by Beena Ahmad.
1 Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 458 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, COUNTERTER-
RORISM WHITE PAPER (June 22, 2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf.
3 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Testimony Before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Apr. 13, 2004) (“Had I known a terrorist
attack on the United States was imminent in 2001, I would have unloaded our full
arsenal of weaponry against it—despite the inevitable criticism. The Justice Depart-
ment’s warriors, our agents, and our prosecutors would have been unleashed. Every
tough tactic we have deployed since the attacks would have been deployed before the
attacks.”), http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing10/ashcroft_statement.
pdf.
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us in our own communities. There was an urgent demand to hold
those responsible for the attacks accountable and even before the
second tower had collapsed Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were
presumed to be responsible. Many people around the world were
learning about bin Laden, al-Qaeda and Islamists for the first time
while “experts” on Islamic Law were discussing the foundations
and history of Qur’anic interpretations supporting the Islamists’
views that led to the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda had inflicted a
devastating blow to the American psyche that propelled Osama bin
Laden to the front pages of newspapers around the world as well as
to the top of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) most
wanted lists.4
The Department of Justice, under pressure from the President
and state law enforcement agencies to prevent and obstruct future
attacks, pledged to protect America using all available law enforce-
ment tools. Then-acting U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
stated: “We will use every available statute. We will seek every
prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law
and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for
America.”5 These statements marked a watershed moment in the
methods and procedures that were used to combat terrorism.
The Department of Justice’s shift from the traditional prosecu-
tion of suspected terrorists to the prevention of attacks before they
occurred6 gained traction in the terrorism support statutes7 and
the federal material witness law.8 Both were used as tools to preven-
tively detain and target individuals who were suspected of being
members of or supporting terrorist organizations.9
4 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, The FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives,
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/fugitives/fugitives.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2010); Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists, http://www.fbi.
gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); David Johnston &
Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation; U.S. Lists Most Wanted Terrorists
and Offers Reward of Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A1.
5 U.S. Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference
(Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/ag
crisisremarks10_25.htm.
6 Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–27 (2005).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/index.htm (click “Misuse of the Ma-
terial Witness Law to Hold Suspects as Witnesses”); see also Bradley A. Parker, Abuse of
the Material Witness: Suspects Detained as Witnesses in Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 36
RUTGERS L. REC. 22 (2009).
9 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 26–47.
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The federal terrorism support statutes that ban and criminal-
ize the provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist
organizations have been broadly reinterpreted and applied outside
of their original scope, which has resulted in violations of First
Amendment rights. The Department of Justice’s expansive and
broad characterization of what constitutes material support has led
to misguided prosecutions under the guise of the “War on Terror”
that do nothing to actually combat the organizations and individu-
als that pose a clear and present danger to American lives.
In this Note, I argue that the present prohibition on providing
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations in
the form of “expert advice and assistance” is misguided in the
larger context of the interminable “War on Terror.” The prohibi-
tion should be viewed as a violation of the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution because the terrorism support statutes are not in
accord with Scales v. United States10 and Brandenburg v. Ohio.11 The
broad interpretation of material support prohibitions is a throw-
back to McCarthyism and essentially criminalizes the provision of
advice only when offered to a certain disfavored political organiza-
tion that has been designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (“FTO”). Finally, I argue that material sup-
port statutes should be narrowly drawn, requiring specific intent to
further the illegal aims of an FTO in order to prevent misguided
prosecutions against individuals who have no intention to support
the illegal aims of a designated FTO. Focusing law enforcement
resources on individuals who do not intend to support violent or
even illegal acts of an organization ultimately makes us more vul-
nerable to future attacks.
I. A HISTORY OF CRIMINALIZING MATERIAL SUPPORT
A. Pre-September 11, 2001 Federal Material Support Statutes
Following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,12
Congress passed legislation that had been in the works since
1991,13 which sought to eliminate economic support to terrorist
organizations.14 The first material witness statute, codified as 18
10 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
11 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12 See Ralph Blumenthal, Explosion at the Twin Towers: The Investigation; Bomb is Defi-
nite Answer, But All Else is Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, § 1, at 34; The Twin Towers:
The Complaint; Starting with Debris, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at B3.
13 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 11–12.
14 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103–322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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U.S.C. § 2339A, was part of this legislation. Section 2339A criminal-
ized the provision of “material support” to any individual or organi-
zation when the donor “kn[ew] or intend[ed] that [the material
support was] to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” one
or more criminal violations enumerated in the statute.15 This first
material support statute only criminalized the provision of material
support where the donor specifically intended for the aid to sup-
port terrorist activity.16 This narrow definition did not result in a
complete ban on support for criminal activity because individuals
15 The first material support statute provided:
§ 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists
(a) DEFINITION.—In this section, ‘material support or resources’
means currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communica-
tions equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, per-
sonnel, transportation, and other physical assets, but does not include
humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such
violations.
(b) OFFENSE.—A person who, within the United States, provides mate-
rial support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location,
source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or in-
tending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a
violation of section 32, 36, 351, 844 (f) or (i), 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361,
1363, 1751, 2280, 2281, 2331, or 2339 of this title or section 46502 of
title 49, or in preparation for or carrying out the concealment of an
escape from the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–322, § 120005, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994); the current 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) provides:
(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever provides material support or resources or
conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of mate-
rial support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used
in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 37, 81,
175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1114, 1116,
1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332,
2332a, 2332b, 2332f, or 2340A of this title, section 236 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), section 46502 or 60123(b) of title
49, or any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) (except for sections
2339A and 2339B) or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the conceal-
ment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or at-
tempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any
person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. A
violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal judicial dis-
trict in which the underlying offense was committed, or in any other
Federal judicial district as provided by law.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
16 Recognizing that the term “terrorist activity” is subjective and generally has been
used to describe a broad range of acts and conduct that may not even include vio-
lence, I have used the term throughout this paper in reference to the enumerated
acts included in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B.
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could still indirectly support terrorist activity as long as they did not
specifically intend for their aid or support to do so.17 The specific-
intent element was so stringent that § 2339A was not very useful or
valuable to federal prosecutors in efforts to eliminate economic
support for terrorism.18
While not extremely valuable to federal prosecutors, § 2339A
is constitutional and does not violate the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has noted that the act of giving money can be con-
sidered an act of expression that deserves First Amendment protec-
tion.19 However, the government may ban speech “where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action.”20 An individual
prosecuted under § 2339A must know or intend that his or her
support will aid in the preparation or carrying out of criminal activ-
ity. The speech or material support is directed toward producing
violence, which the defendant had the intention to support, and
therefore would not be protected by the First Amendment.21
Following the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995,22 Congress
again attempted to eliminate the financing of terrorist organiza-
tions by enacting a more relaxed material support statute that
would reach a broader range of individuals than the existing stat-
ute. Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),23 which created a second material
support statute codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.24 Section 2339B used
17 Chesney, supra note 6, at 13.
18 See id. at 18–19.
19 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Yet this Court has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself
to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment.”).
20 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
21 See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002).
22 See John Kifner, Terror in Oklahoma City: The Overview – At Least 31 Are Dead, Scores
Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Federal Office Building;
12 Victims Were Children in 2d-Floor Day-Care Center, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1;
David Johnston, Terror in Oklahoma: The Overview; Oklahoma Bombing Plotted for Months,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at A1.
23 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, § 303,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
24 Section 2339B as enacted in the AEDPA provided:
Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist
organizations
(a) PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.—
(1) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.—Whoever, within the United States or
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides ma-
terial support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or at-
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the same definition of “material support” as § 2339A25 but elimi-
nated the specific-intent requirement where the recipient of the
aid or support has been designated by the Secretary of State as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”).26 Under § 2339B an indi-
vidual can be prosecuted for “knowingly provid[ing] material sup-
port or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”27 The
omission of a specific intent requirement in § 2339B broadened its
applicability and enhanced the utility of the statute but it was rarely
used by federal prosecutors prior to September 11.28
Interestingly, § 2339B originally contained a licensing scheme
or exception for certain types of aid to groups that had been desig-
nated as an FTO.29 Under this licensing scheme individuals or or-
ganizations would have been able to seek permission from the
Department of the Treasury to provide certain types of aid or sup-
port to the designated FTO.30 The Department of the Treasury
could grant a “license only after the person establishes . . . that . . .
the funds are intended to be used exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, literary, or educational purposes;” and that all recipients have
procedures that “ensure that the funds will be used exclusively for
religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes, and will not
be used to offset a transfer of funds to be used in terrorist activ-
ity.”31 The proposed scheme would have required the donor and
the recipient to keep a record of all transactions that took place
and would have required production of those records on the de-
tempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
25 Id. § 2339 B(g)(4); Cf. supra note 15 for definition of “material support” under
18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
26 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a)(1) (referencing § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act for the definition of a “designated terrorist organization”).
27 Id. § 2339B(a)(1).
28 Chesney, supra note 6, at 19.
29 The proposed licensing scheme provided:
(e)(3) The Secretary shall grant a license only after the person estab-
lishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that—
(A) the funds are intended to be used exclusively for religious,
charitable, literary, or educational purposes; and
(B) all recipient organizations in any fund-raising chain have effec-
tive procedures in place to ensure that the funds (i) will be used
exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational pur-
poses, and (ii) will not be used to offset a transfer of funds to be
used in terrorist activity.
S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(3)(A)–(B)); see
also Chesney, supra note 6, at 15.
30 Chesney, supra note 6, at 15.
31 S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(3)(A)–(B)).
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mand of the Secretary of the Treasury.32 The licensing scheme was
dropped following the Oklahoma City bombing and § 2339B acted
as a prohibition on all fundraising regardless of the intent of the
donor.33
Prior to September 11, 2001, federal prosecutors rarely prose-
cuted individuals under either of the then-existing material sup-
port statutes. The limited use could be attributed to § 2339A’s
narrow scope as a result of its specific-intent requirement while
§ 2339B may have appeared to be too broad for a U.S. Attorney to
fervently seek indictments and convictions because of constitu-
tional concerns. The fact that both statutes were Congressional re-
actions to recent bombings, which had dominated American
media because they were large-scale acts of terror, suggests that the
statutes were more of a political tool than a tool for federal law
enforcement. Regardless of the reason for the limited use of the
material support statutes prior to September 11, federal prosecu-
tors after September 11 increasingly began to target a wide range
of individuals who had allegedly provided material support to ter-
rorist organizations.
B. Post-September 11 Federal Terrorism-Support Statutes
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon, Congress hastily signed34 the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act35 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) into law. The
USA PATRIOT Act broadly sought “to deter and punish terrorist
acts in the United States and around the world” and “to enhance
law enforcement investigatory tools.”36
The USA PATRIOT Act made a few changes to the existing
material support laws. Most importantly, § 805(a)(2)(B) added
“expert advice or assistance” to the definition of “material support”
in § 2339A,37 which also acts as the definition under § 2339B.38
This addition expanded the original definition, which targeted
32 Id. (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(4)).
33 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 15–16.
34 See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate’s, but
With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6.
35 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
36 Id. at 272.
37 Id. § 805(a)(2)(B).
38 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (2006).
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mainly tangible support in the form of money, weapons, and other
similar goods and services, to include the vague prohibition on
providing “expert advice or assistance.”39 The addition of “expert
advice or assistance” by § 805(a)(2)(B) has been the target of sev-
eral First Amendment challenges.
Section 805(a)(2)(B) of the USA PATRIOT Act was chal-
lenged on First Amendment grounds by several humanitarian
groups that provided support to the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdi-
stan Worker’s Party. In Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft,40 the
plaintiffs argued that § 805(a)(2)(B) violated First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and association and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances because there was no
requirement of “specific intent to further the organization’s unlaw-
ful ends.”41 Next they argued that § 805(a)(2)(B) invites “view-
point discriminatory targeting of particular groups and their
supporters based on their political views” because the Secretary of
State has “effectively unreviewable authority to designate foreign
organizations as ‘terrorist’ and [to] prohibit the provision of ‘ex-
pert advice and assistance’” to that politically disfavored group.42
Finally, the plaintiffs attacked § 805(a)(2)(B) and its prohibition
on “expert advice and assistance” as being “impermissibly vague
and substantially overbroad” and as a result § 805(a)(2)(B) fails “to
afford adequate notice to individuals of what is prohibited, giving
government officials unfettered discretion in enforcement” and
causes individuals to refrain from taking part in First Amendment
protected activity.43 The court found that the term “expert advice
or assistance” was impermissibly vague44 but rejected the argument
that § 805(a)(2)(B) was overbroad.45
Following the decision in Humanitarian Law Project46 that
§ 805(a)(2)(B) was impermissibly vague, Congress sought to de-
fine “expert advice or assistance.” Congress passed the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”),47 which
amended the definition section of the first material support stat-
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006).
40 Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
41 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 49, Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject v. Ashcroft, No. 03-6107 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003).
42 Id. ¶ 51.
43 Id. ¶ 53.
44 Humanitarian Law Project, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1199–1201.
45 Id. at 1201–03.
46 Id.
47 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108–458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
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ute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).48 In IRTPA, Congress defined “ex-
pert advice or assistance” as “advice or assistance derived from
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”49 While this
may have added some clarity to exactly what “expert advice or assis-
tance” was to be punished, others argue that “[i]t provide[d] no
additional clarity, and in fact exacerbate[d] the statute’s vagueness,
because now an individual must guess as to whether the knowledge
that makes his advice ‘expert’ is ‘specialized’ or not.”50
The federal material support statutes have developed as re-
sponses to the terror acts that have occurred within the United
States since 1993.51 The first material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A, was narrowly drawn and was rarely used. The second ma-
terial support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was enacted to eliminate
the “loophole” that arose under the § 2339A requirement of spe-
cific intent; nonetheless federal prosecutors rarely used the statute
as a tool to combat terrorism support prior to September 11. Fol-
lowing September 11, the Department of Justice broadly reinter-
preted the statutes so that they could be used as a tool to prevent
and obstruct future terrorist attacks. The material support statutes
were broadly applied beyond their originally intended scope and as
a result are now being used in violation of the First Amendment.
II. MATERIAL SUPPORT MISSION CREEP
A. First Amendment Implications
The First Amendment does not provide absolute protection to
all types of speech. Unprotected categories of speech relevant to
the material support statutes include fighting words,52 incitement
to illegal activity or imminent violence,53 and true threats or intimi-
dation.54 It follows quite uncontested that violent conduct and
speech that threatens violence may be constitutionally prose-
cuted.55 Therefore, individuals who intend to support violent ter-
rorist activity by providing material support as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(1) can be constitutionally prosecuted and punished
under § 2339A because they possess the specific intent required by
48 Id. § 6603(b).
49 Id.
50 PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Stewart A. Baker &
John Kavanagh eds., 2005).
51 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 12.
52 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
53 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
54 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
55 See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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the first material support statute. This comports with the First
Amendment.
Possible conflict with the First Amendment arises in cases
where there is no obvious or provable specific intent to further the
violent goals of a terrorist organization. The second material sup-
port statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was specifically created to address
these cases but the broad scope of application by federal prosecu-
tors has resulted in a statute that criminalizes First Amendment
protected speech and acts as a tool to punish individuals whose
conduct cannot be linked to any specific terrorist attack or violent
conduct.
In this section I do not challenge the long-standing constitu-
tional jurisprudence that criminalizes speech that threatens vio-
lence or that results in violence. I seek to illustrate that the broad
interpretation of the material support statutes following September
11 has criminalized speech in violation of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution in two different contexts. First, § 2339B in-
fringes on the protected First Amendment right of association by
criminalizing material support only when offered to a politically
disfavored group. As applied by the government, punishment
hinges not on individual intent to further terrorist activity but on
the identity of the organization that has received the material sup-
port. Individuals are prosecuted and punished because of their ten-
uous connection to others who have committed illegal acts even
though there is no showing of an individualized specific intent to
further terrorist activity. Second, § 2339B criminalizes First Amend-
ment protected speech even where the speech is not directed to
incite or produce imminent lawless action and is not likely to incite
or produce such lawless action.56
B. Guilt by Association: FTOs and the Need For Specific Intent
1. Scales v. United States and Specific Intent
An individual’s freedom of association is rooted in both the
First Amendment and the “liberty” interest guaranteed in the Four-
teenth Amendment57 to the U.S. Constitution. The First Amend-
ment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
56 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that an Ohio criminal syndicalism law
violated an individual’s right to free speech because the law criminalized advocacy
and teaching of disfavored doctrines without considering whether that conduct would
actually incite imminent lawless action).
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
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freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.”58 The Supreme Court has recognized that
group association is closely related to the constitutionally protected
freedoms of speech and assembly.59 The Court has also acknowl-
edged that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in associ-
ation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”60
The right of free association applies when an individual assem-
bles as part of a group to partake in protected First Amendment
activities. The right to join with other people to advocate for a par-
ticular political, cultural, educational, or economic opinion or view
is known as the right of “expressive association.”61 The Supreme
Court has recognized that “‘implicit in the right to engage in activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.’ This right is
crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular,
ideas.”62 Based on the foregoing, individuals have a clearly recog-
nized constitutional right of free association.
Since freedom of association is a constitutionally protected
right, an individual cannot be punished for their membership or
association with a particular group. Generally, for guilt to be
shared, an organization and its members must have a common
plan evidenced by a specific intent to commit unlawful acts.63 In
Scales v. United States, the Court stated:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition
of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by
reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other
concededly criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be suffi-
ciently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in or-
der to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organiza-
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advo-
cacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is unde-
niably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized
by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”).
60 Id.
61 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000).
62 Id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
63 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961).
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tion engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not hereto-
fore been recognized by this Court to be such a relationship.64
Therefore, in order to punish a defendant in accord with the Con-
stitution, Scales requires that the government establish personal
guilt by proving that “a defendant ‘specifically intend[s] to accom-
plish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.’”65
While Scales focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,66 the Court also determined that the same showing
of specific intent was required to comport with the First Amend-
ment.67 Scales recognized “there would indeed be a real danger
that legitimate political expression or association would be im-
paired” if a “blanket prohibition of association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims” was deemed to be constitutional.68 The
Court then held that the First Amendment prohibits punishing in-
dividuals based solely on their support of a group’s legal aims or
conduct.69
Where a group or organization is linked to both illegal and
legal activity, the First Amendment requires that the government
prove the individual intended to support or further the illegal aims
of the group. Without a showing of the specific intent to support or
further the illegal acts of the group, an individual may not be
punished.
2. Forgetting Scales: 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
The second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was
meant to eliminate the perceived narrow utility of the first material
support statute70 and address the criticisms of the “loophole” cre-
ated by requiring an individual to possess the specific intent to fur-
ther a group’s illegal aims.71 Critics argued that the specific intent
requirement created a “loophole” because individuals could do-
nate to groups that were engaged in both legal and illegal conduct
but claimed that they only intended to support the legal aims of
the group, such as educational or social aid.72 Thereby, they would
not be subject to the statute and their donations and support
64 Id. at 224–25.
65 Id. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67 Scales, 367 U.S. at 228–29.
68 Id. at 229.
69 Id.
70 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
71 See Chesney, supra note 6, at 12–18 & 13 n.72–73.
72 Id.
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would not be subject to any sanctions under the material support
law.73
This “loophole” was the one provision that clearly made the
first material support statute constitutional. Section 2339A specifi-
cally requires that the individual knew or intended that their sup-
port or aid was “to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out”
illegal acts.74 This is in accord with Scales because the individual is
only punished where he has the specific intent to further the illegal
acts of the group.75 Also, § 2339A does not rely on the identity of
the recipient to determine whether an individual has violated the
statute.76 Section 2339A is constitutional because it simply punishes
any material support provided with the intent to further the illegal
aims or conduct of any group or organization.77
One component of the second material support statute that is
problematic concerns the addition of “expert advice or assistance”
to the definition of “material support.”78 The definition of “mate-
rial support” previously included only tangible support while the
USA PATRIOT Act injected the vague notion of “expert advice or
assistance” which has the potential to criminalize speech.79 Under
§ 2339A this is not problematic because the requirement of spe-
cific intent serves to punish individuals who intend for their sup-
port to further illegal activity.80 Under § 2339B, however, the
addition of “expert advice or assistance” opened the door to prose-
cute individuals who did not intend to further the illegal aims of
the group. Their provision of “expert advice or assistance” was only
criminalized because their “expert advice or assistance” had been
offered to a group that had been designated as a FTO. Therefore,
the individual was not required to possess the specific intent of fur-
thering the FTO’s illegal aims. This does not comport with Scales as
the statute has the potential to punish members of a group who
intend to support only the legal aims of that group.
Section 2339B ultimately relies on the recipients’ identity to
73 However, financial transactions could be prohibited and assets could be seized
pursuant to emergency powers possessed by the Executive under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006).
74 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
75 Cf. Scales, 367 U.S. at 228.
76 Chesney, supra note 6, at 18.
77 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
78 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 805(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 272
(2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2006).
79 Compare Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–322,
§ 120005, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), and 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
80 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
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determine whether the provision of support is criminalized or
not.81 The Secretary of State has the authority to designate an or-
ganization as a “foreign terrorist organization.”82 The AEDPA83 cre-
ated the second material support statute84 and also amended § 219
of the Immigration and Nationality Act85 to provide the Secretary
of State with this authority as a necessary adjunct to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B. To designate an organization as an FTO the Secretary of
State must find that “(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity . . . ; and (C) the
terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of
United States nationals or the national security of the United
States.”86 The Secretary of State can decide at any time that an or-
ganization meets the enumerated conditions and may add that or-
ganization to the FTO list87 by informing Congress and publishing
notice of the designation in the Federal Register.88 The designa-
tion becomes effective for purposes of the second material support
statute89 upon publication in the Federal Register; however, any
designation can “cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress dis-
approving such designation.”90
Section 2339B clearly requires a knowledge standard,91 but
this does not necessarily mean that an individual specifically in-
tended to support terrorist activity; nevertheless, an individual’s
provision of “expert advice or assistance” can be punished if the
organization has been designated as an FTO. Section 2339B states
“[t]o violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that
81 See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).
82 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2006).
83 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, § 303,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
85 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006).
86 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, § 302,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
87 “FTO list” refers to the list of organizations that have been designated as a “for-
eign terrorist organization” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). As of January 9, 2010
there were 45 designated FTOs. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Fact Sheet, http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
88 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132,
§ 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
90 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132,
§ 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(B)).
91 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 724 (8th ed. 2005) (defining “knowledge” as “[a]n
awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a
person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact”).
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the organization is a designated terrorist organization” or that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity or
terrorism.92
There is no consideration of what the individual’s actual in-
tent was under § 2339B. It is enough that the individual provided
“expert advice or assistance” to an organization that he or she knew
had been designated as an FTO. Under this standard the individ-
ual who provided the “expert advice or assistance” could be crimi-
nally liable regardless of what his or her actual intent was at the
time. This clearly does not follow Scales’s requirement of possessing
a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization.
Section 2339B includes no requirement of specific intent to
further the illegal aims of an organization as required by Scales.
The requirement that “a person must have knowledge that the or-
ganization is a designated terrorist organization” does not equate a
specific intent requirement because the actual intent of the indi-
vidual is irrelevant.93 Without requiring specific intent the statute is
most likely unconstitutional on its face, at least concerning the pro-
vision of “expert advice or assistance,” because the individual could
be providing expert advice to an FTO on how to end their violent
ways. Under § 2339B, criminal liability would be imposed “without
regard to the purpose or effect of the actual support provided” or
the actual intent of the person providing the support.94
Ultimately, § 2339B criminalizes individuals for being associ-
ated with a politically disfavored group that has been designated as
an FTO. Professor David Cole, one of the main opponents of the
amended material support statute, has characterized § 2339B as:
a classic instance of guilt by association. It imposes liability re-
gardless of an individual’s own intentions or purposes, based
solely on the individual’s connection to others who have com-
mitted illegal acts. Moreover, it imposes liability highly selec-
tively. . . . [I]t selectively prohibits material support only to those
groups that the Secretary of State in his [or her] discretion
chooses to designate.95
The selectivity and the lack of a specific intent requirement result
in a statute that is open to extremely broad interpretations and has
92 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (using “terrorist activity” as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and “terrorism” as defined in
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989).
93 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
94 Cole, supra note 81, at 9–10.
95 Id. at 10.
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been used as a preventive law enforcement tool because § 2339B
“do[es] not require proof that an individual intended to further
any terrorist activity.”96
3. The Case of Javed Iqbal
The case of Javed Iqbal shows how the lack of a specific intent
requirement in § 2339B can lead to the prosecution of individuals
who have no intent to further the illegal activity of a group. Iqbal
was a Pakistani immigrant who had been in the United States for
over 20 years.97 He operated a small company out of a Brooklyn
storefront and from his garage located at his home in Mariners
Harbor, Staten Island.98 Iqbal’s business was called HDTV Ltd.,
and provided satellite television packages and broadcasts to its cus-
tomers.99 Iqbal was indicted for providing services that included
satellite broadcasts of the television station, Al-Manar.100 Al-Manar
is controlled by the designated FTO Hezbollah.101 Because Al-
Manar was controlled by an FTO, Iqbal was charged under the sec-
ond material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, for providing ma-
terial support in the form of “expert advice or assistance and
facilities” to an FTO.102 If convicted of the charges contained in the
indictment Iqbal would have faced “a maximum sentence of 110
years imprisonment.”103 Iqbal pled guilty and recently received a
sentence of 69 months.104
The broad interpretation of § 2339B as applied to the case of
Javed Iqbal has serious First Amendment issues. There is no re-
96 Id. at 9.
97 William K. Rashbaum, Law Put to Unusual Use in Hezbollah TV Case, Some Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at B2.
98 Timothy Williams and William K. Rashbaum, Man on Staten Island Is Charged in
Sale of Access to Hezbollah TV, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at B1.
99 Press Release, U.S. Attorney Southern District of New York, U.S. Arrests Two for
Supporting Hizballah (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/November06/iqbalandelahwalindictmentpr.pdf.
100 See Al-Manar TV, http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/HomePage.aspx?lang
uage=en (last visited Mar. 3, 2010); Jennifer 8. Lee and William K. Rashbaum, Man
Posts Bail in Hezbollah TV Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006.
101 Jennifer 8. Lee and William K. Rashbaum, Man Is out in Case of Access to Hezbollah
TV, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at B4; Indictment at ¶ 3, United States v. Iqbal, No. S1
06 Cr. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that Hezbollah was designated as an FTO on or
about Oct. 8, 1997).
102 Indictment at ¶ 9, United States v. Iqbal, No. S1 06 Cr. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
103 Press Release, U.S. Attorney Southern District of New York, U.S. Arrests Two for
Supporting Hizballah (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/November06/iqbalandelahwalindictmentpr.pdf.
104 Benjamin Weiser, S.I. Man Gets Prison Term for Aid to Hezbollah TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2009, at A22.
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quirement that Iqbal intended to further the illegal aims of
Hezbollah and under Scales Iqbal should not be held criminally lia-
ble. Hezbollah is a Lebanese political and military organization
that was formed in the 1980s to drive Israeli forces from Lebanon.
Hezbollah also has several seats in the Lebanese parliament.  Thus,
Hezbollah has both legal and illegal aims since they provide a wide
variety of social services such as medical care and education ser-
vices to various communities throughout Lebanon.
To be punished under Scales, Iqbal must possess the specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization. There is
no evidence that Iqbal sought to support the illegal aims of Hezbol-
lah by providing customers with access to Al-Manar. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that Iqbal sought to support any goals of
Hezbollah. The only evidence that the government cites is the ex-
change of satellite broadcasts for money.105 Hezbollah did pay
Iqbal, but this only proves that a business connection existed be-
tween the two, not that Iqbal intended to further the terrorist activ-
ity of Hezbollah by providing “expert advice or assistance.” Scales
demands much more.
First Amendment challenges were raised to the criminal
charges but the judge rejected them. Judge Richard M. Berman
ruled “that the prosecution was based not on the content of speech
but on conduct—allegations that [Iqbal] provided material sup-
port to a foreign terrorist group.”106 Judge Berman’s focus on the
conduct of providing material support when that material support
is “expert advice or assistance” is constitutionally troublesome be-
cause the speech is being criminalized based on the identity of the
recipient. There is no consideration of Iqbal’s intent under Judge
Berman’s ruling. This constitutes guilt by association because it
does not follow the Scales requirement of specific intent to further
the unlawful acts of an organization.
The lack of a specific intent requirement allows for the prose-
cution of individuals that did not intend to further the illegal activi-
ties of a group. Under § 2339B, an individual like Iqbal can be
punished for being associated with a group such as Hezbollah that
has both legal and illegal aims. The only protection against the
government’s broad interpretation of § 2339B following Septem-
ber 11 is to require specific intent.
105 Indictment at ¶ 13, United States v. Iqbal, No. S1 06 Cr. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
106 Benjamin Weiser, A Guilty Plea in Providing Satellite TV for Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2008, at A21.
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C. Criminalizing Pure Speech: Where’s Brandenburg?
The addition of “expert advice or assistance” to the definition
of material support and the prohibition on all “expert advice or
assistance” does not satisfy the constitutional requirements set
forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.107 Brandenburg states, “[T]he constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.”108 The Court reasoned that “‘[t]he mere abstract teaching
. . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to
force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action’”109 and therefore “[a] statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It
sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has
immunized from governmental control.”110
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B any and all “expert advice or assis-
tance” provided to a designated FTO is criminalized. “Expert ad-
vice or assistance” should clearly be considered pure speech
because the term encompasses both written and spoken words and
conduct that conveys information and ideas.111 Under the current
construction, an attorney working on human rights issues in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories who provides advice or assistance
to a leader of Hamas concerning how they can conduct themselves
so they do not violate international human rights conventions
could potentially be prosecuted for providing non-violent advice.
The attorney’s speech would be criminalized regardless of whether
it was “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and [was] likely to incite or produce such action.”112 This construc-
tion is in violation of Brandenburg.
The prohibition on all “expert advice or assistance” without
regard to its connection to lawless activity is in violation of Branden-
burg and creates a chilling effect on protected speech. The case of
Javed Iqbal illustrates this because he was providing the satellite
broadcasts of Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s satellite television station.113
107 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
108 Id. at 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 447–48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
110 Id. at 448.
111 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (8th ed. 2005).
112 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
113 See Indictment at ¶ 9, United States v. Iqbal, No. S1 06 Cr. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Al-Manar’s programming is “sophisticated and diverse, ranging
from soap operas and dramas, produced in Syria and Iran,” to mu-
sic videos and religious programming.114 Some of the program-
ming can be characterized as “racist and anti-Semitic” and has
included programming that promotes suicide bombings against
American troops in Iraq.115 However, Iqbal was importing and dis-
tributing a newsfeed or satellite programming. He wasn’t recruit-
ing suicide bombers to attack American troops in Iraq and there
was no evidence that he was broadcasting Al-Manar to incite immi-
nent lawless action. Iqbal’s conduct was contributing to the free
marketplace of ideas. Iqbal’s advice or assistance provided by
broadcasting Al-Manar’s programming cannot be punished unless
his advocacy was directed at inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and was likely to incite or produce such action. There is
no evidence to suggest that the broadcasting resulted in a clear and
present danger to the public welfare and therefore the criminaliza-
tion of Iqbal’s conduct constitutes censorship of pure speech.
The broad scope of what the government has decided falls
within the definition of material support forces individuals to look
at what programming they provide and what information they are
associated with. An individual’s actual intent is not the main con-
sideration under § 2339B. Rather, criminalization hinges on the
organization the support is provided to and the content associated
with that group. If the group is an FTO and they support illegal
and legal aims, an individual could be prosecuted regardless of
whether their advice had anything to do with lawless activity. This
can only lead to less and less information and viewpoints being rep-
resented in the marketplace of ideas. More speech is the answer
and tolerance of that speech is what Brandenburg requires as long as
the speech is not “directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action [that] is likely to incite or produce such action.”116
The second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, vio-
lates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it does
not include the provisions required by Scales and Brandenburg. Sec-
tion 2339B has been unconstitutionally applied to the case of Javed
Iqbal and this illustrates how the broad interpretation has allowed
authorities to “sweep up large numbers of people without having to
prove that [they] engaged in specific harmful conduct.”117 This
114 Timothy Williams and William K. Rashbaum, New York Man Charged with Ena-
bling Hezbollah Television Broadcasts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at B1.
115 Id.
116 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
117 Cole, supra note 81, at 4.
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reeks of the McCarthy era and should be seriously addressed to
prevent the further constriction and censorship of the freedom of
expression.118
III. BURYING MCCARTHY: A NEW MATERIAL SUPPORT APPROACH
The second material support statute, § 2339B, does not ade-
quately ensure that individuals will possess the specific intent to
further a designated group’s illegal conduct as required in Scales,
nor does it require that the speech be directed at inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action as required by Brandenburg. The
statute prohibits support that is directed toward the legal political
or social goals of a group the same as it prohibits support for the
illegal aims of the group. A few significant changes can help make
§ 2339B agree with the First Amendment.
First, the statute must include a requirement of specific intent
to further the illegal aims of an FTO where the FTO has both ille-
gal and legal goals. This is the only way to construct § 2339B so that
it is in accord with the First Amendment right of free association.
Punishing individuals for the illegal aims of a group where they
had no intention to further those aims constitutes guilt by associa-
tion and has no place in our justice system no matter what the
situation may be. Our system focuses on personal guilt and there
must be a connection between a group’s illegal goals and the indi-
vidual’s intent that is being prosecuted.119 Scales illustrates the de-
gree of the connection and requires that “a defendant ‘specifically
intend(s) to accomplish (the aims of the organization) by resort to
violence.’”120 This is what justice requires and this needs to be in-
cluded within § 2339B.
The statute cannot criminalize “expert advice or assistance”
that is not directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless activ-
ity. To be consistent with Brandenburg there must be an exception
for the provision of non-violent advice and assistance. This would
not be so difficult because Congress has previously considered a
licensing scheme that would allow for individuals to donate or pro-
vide material support to an FTO as long as they sought permission
from the Secretary of State.121 The previously proposed licensing
118 See id.
119 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961).
120 Id. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).
121 The proposed licensing scheme provided:
(e) AUTHORIZED TRANSACTIONS—
(1) The Secretary shall publish regulations, consistent with the pro-
visions of this subsection, setting forth the procedures to be fol-
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scheme allowed for aid that was “exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, literary, or educational purposes.”122 This could be updated
and enacted to provide licensing to individuals seeking to provide
“expert advice or assistance” for religious, charitable, literary, or
educational purposes. This licensing scheme would work to ensure
that the only material support that was punished could be charac-
terized as creating or posing a danger to the public welfare.
These two substantive changes would help relieve § 2339B of
its problematic First Amendment issues because guilt would be im-
posed based on the intent of the defendant rather than on the
identity of the recipient of the support. The licensing scheme
would provide individuals who sought to only support the legiti-
mate legal goals or activities of an FTO to do so. Thereby, the stat-
ute would specifically target conduct that intends to support
terrorist activity.
lowed by persons seeking to raise or provide funds for an
organization designated under subsection (c)(1).
(2) Any person within the United States, or any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States anywhere, who seeks to solicit
funds for or to transfer funds to any organization or person desig-
nated under subsection (c) shall, regardless of whether it has an
agency relationship with the designated organization or person,
first obtain a license from the Secretary and may thereafter solicit
funds or transfer funds to a designated organization or person only
as permitted under the terms of a license issued by the Secretary.
(3) The Secretary shall grant a license only after the person estab-
lishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that—
(A) the funds are intended to be used exclusively for religious,
charitable, literary, or educational purposes; and
(B) all recipient organizations in any fund-raising chain have
effective procedures in place to ensure that the funds (i) will
be used exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, and (ii) will not be used to offset a transfer of
funds to be used in terrorist activity.
(4) Any person granted a license shall maintain books and records,
as required by the Secretary, that establish the source of all funds it
receives, expenses it incurs, and disbursements it makes. Such
books and records shall be made available for inspection within two
business days of a request by the Secretary. Any person granted a
license shall also have an agreement with any recipient organiza-
tion or person that such organization’s or person’s books and
records, wherever located, must be made available for inspection of
the Secretary upon a request of the Secretary at a place and time
agreeable to that organization or person and the Secretary.
(5) The Secretary may also provide by regulation procedures for
the licensing of transactions otherwise prohibited by this section in
cases found by the Secretary to be consistent with the statement of
purpose in subsection (a)(2).
S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(3)(A) & (B)).
122 Id.
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CONCLUSION
The terrorism support statutes have been radically reinter-
preted following the September 11 attacks as a result of the Depart-
ment of Justice’s shift toward a preventive law enforcement system
that was justified by exigency to stop a terrorist attack. However,
the use of the material support statute following the attacks has
violated First Amendment rights of association and speech. The
use of the statute in this manner is unjustified because its interpre-
tation is so broad that it swept up within it individuals such as Javed
Iqbal, who did not have any intention of supporting terrorist acts.
The broad interpretation was used as a means to institute a system
of preventive law enforcement but has resulted in the misdirection
of preventive efforts because time, money, and other resources
have been directed at prosecuting individuals who did not intend
to support violent acts of terror. The second material support stat-
ute should be amended to prevent further violations of the First
Amendment and to protect the robust marketplace of ideas that
American jurisprudence has embraced since its founding.
